































Author Author and Author Author  
MWP 2013/20 
Max Weber Programme 
 
Choosing the Form of Government: Theory and 
Evidence from Brazil 
 









  European University Institute 








Marcos Yamada Nakaguma 
 






This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 





© Marcos Yamada Nakaguma, 2013 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 







This paper proposes a model to study the main factors that influence the preferences of different 
population groups between presidential and parliamentary systems. Our theory suggests that the 
parliamentary regime leads to a type of Öscal decentralization in the form of more transfers to 
constituencies. Ceteris paribus, the poor groups in the population tend to prefer a presidential system 
relatively more than the rich, since the lower quality of their local accountability institutions (e.g. local 
media and judicial courts) makes them more vulnerable to the expropriation of rents by their 
legislators. We also show that in order to perform adequately a parliamentary regime depends on the 
existence of a class of politicians that can be trusted to represent well the interests of voters. Our 
model is able to account for the main stylized facts emerging from an analysis of referendum data 
from Brazil. 
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The form of government is one of the most important features of the organization of a democracy,
as it establishes rules about how the government is to be appointed and removed from o¢ ce. There
are two major systems: a presidential regime, where the executive is directly elected by voters and
is guaranteed to stay in o¢ ce for a xed term, and a parliamentary regime, where the executive
is appointed by the parliament and may be removed if it receives a vote of no condence. The
choice of form of government is a recurrent and controversial issue in many societies, and debates
about it should gain further relevance as more countries move to democratic systems and as new
democracies gradually consolidate.1
Despite the existence of a large literature studying the di¤erences between presidential and
parliamentary systems, little attention has been devoted to the question of what determines the
choice of form of government. Among the few papers that examine this issue, the focus has
been either on the historical context behind the choice (Persson and Tabelini [2003] and Cheibub
[2007]) or on the interests of elites to impose a particular regime (Lijphart [1992], Easter [1997] and
Robinson and Torvik [2009]). Still, the challenges posed by constitutional design in modern societies
make it important that we understand how these issues are perceived by citizens, particularly
because such decisions are likely to depend more and more on the populations consent, either
informally through protests and public manifestations or formally through referenda.
This paper studies the main factors that determine the constitutional preferences of citizens
over the form of government. In order to motivate our theoretical analysis, we rst study the case
of Brazil, where a referendum in 1993 allowed the population to choose between a presidential
and a parliamentary system. In doing so, we rely on a novel dataset consisting of the results of
the referendum at municipal level as well as several opinion surveys conducted at that time. This
information provides a unique opportunity to observe the constitutional preferences of di¤erent
population groups and allows us to study the question of choice of the form of government directly
from the perspective of citizens.
The analysis of the data reveals a surprising new fact: while the Brazilian population in general
voted in favour of a presidential system, there exists a strong positive correlation between income
per capita and the percentage of votes cast for a parliamentary regime across municipalities; that
is, the poor (rich) groups in the population voted more for a presidential (parliamentary) system.2
We further document that among the electorate a common reason for rejecting a parliamentary
regime was the absence of direct elections for the executive in connection with a lack of condence
in the congress. The general perception was that corruption was widespread among legislators and
that a parliamentary system would further exacerbate the problem.3
1The possibility of a change in the form of government has been recently considered in several countries, including
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Korea, Tunisia and
Turkey (Cheibub [2007]).
2Using detailed survey data, we show that this evidence cannot be explained by the fact that the poor individuals
simply lacked knowledge about the referendum and, therefore, voted more for a presidential system merely because
it represented the status quo.
3As in many developing countries, corruption was (and still is) a major concern in Brazil. The magnitude of the
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The evidence from Brazil is, in a sense, quite puzzling and the existing papers in the literature
(Persson, Roland and Tabelini [1997, 2000] and Robinson and Torvik [2009]) are unable to account
for the fact that the poorer citizens were more likely to vote for a presidential system. We pro-
pose a theoretical model to explain the general pattern of the referendum results, focusing on a
fundamental di¤erence between presidential and parliamentary systems: on the one hand, direct
elections for a president allow voters to hold the executive leader directly accountable, but imply
that the president may not be removed from o¢ ce before the next elections; on the other hand,
a vote of no condence transfers to legislators the responsibility for monitoring the executive, but
provides a mechanism to replace the prime minister before the end of his term.
Our formal analysis emphasizes that the bargaining power of legislators is larger under parlia-
mentary systems. This enables them to push for higher transfers to constituencies, which in turn
expands their own capacity to extract rents. Intuitively, these funds are intended to nance the
provision of local public goods (e.g. investment in education), but are also subject to expropriation
by legislators. Since the quality of local accountability institutions (e.g. the local media and judicial
courts) is heterogeneous across regions, and usually lower in poorer constituencies, the burden of
corruption tends to fall disproportionately on the poor population.4 ;5 As a result, a parliamentary
system is relatively less attractive to the poor than to the rich.
In a presidential system, on the other hand, the bargaining power of legislators is diminished,
which limits the size of transfers and the amount of political rents that they are able to obtain. Now,
it is the executive leader who is in a stronger position to extract rents, which he does by deviating
resources from the federal budget. At the national level, the executive leader is subject to the
control of institutions such as large media outlets, federal prosecutors and investigative agencies,
which provide common protection to the population as a whole. As a consequence, the burden of
corruption imposed by the executive is distributed more uniformly among voters and there is less
dependence on local institutions.6
Why should local accountability institutions matter to control federal level legislators? The
process of corruption consists of a complex chain of illegal transactions involving several agents,
problem is huge: it is estimated that, every year, at least US$ 3:5 billion (or 1:5% of Brazils GDP) are diverted just
through corruption from the federal funds transferred to muncipal governments for investment in basic education,
health and infrastructure. These estimates are based on audit reports published by the Controladoria-Geral da Uniao
(CGU) (Folha de Sao Paulo, 9/4/2011).
4 In Brazil, the quality of local institutions displays considerable regional variation. For instance, Pinheiro and
Cabral (1999) report that members of the judiciary tend to be less prepared in poorer regions, citing the case of a
judge who still used old and revoked legislation as basis for his decisions.
5This implication of the model is consistent with Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011), who nd that the presence of
local media (i.e. a radio station or a local newspaper) reduces the incidence of corruption in Brazilian municipalities.
6The model captures the idea that the corruption practices of executive leaders tend to be more centralized in
nature, impacting broader sectors of the population at the same time. This notion is consistent with several corruption
cases uncovered in Latin America and other developing countries in recent decades. For instance, presidents Fernando
Collor de Mello (Brazil), Arnoldo Aleman (Nicaragua), Alberto Fujimori (Peru) and Carlos Andres Perez (Venezuela)
were all charged with running large corruption schemes, often involving outright expropriation of public funds (e.g.
Fujimori was found guilty of giving US$ 15 million from the Peruvian treasury to his former intelligence service chief)
and large scale inuence-peddling schemes (e.g. Collor de Mello ran a vast scheme that sold "government favors" all
around the country through his campaign treasurer).
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including congressmen, contractors, public servants and mayors. As in many other countries, in
Brazil it usually begins when a contractor approaches a congressman to "propose" a project, say,
the construction of a bridge, in a municipality where that legislator has strong political inuence.
The congressman starts to sponsor the project and works to obtain political support in congress,
technical and regulatory approvals from government agencies, as well as the disbursement of funds.7
Next, at the local level, the procurement process is manipulated, usually with the participation of
municipal authorities, in order to ensure that the contract goes to the "right" rm, typically for
a value above the market price. Finally, the contractor obtains a prot and distributes rents in
the form of bribes, gifts and campaign contributions to the several agents involved in the process.
Therefore, expropriation presupposes a series of corrupt acts which take place at the local level.
As a consequence, local institutions play an important role in restraining corruption by legislators.
For instance, local prosecutors and judges are instrumental in investigating and judging cases of
procurement fraud, money laundering and illicit enrichment, which are all crimes committed at the
local level.
The model generates other interesting results. We examine how the form of government in-
uences the choice of a national public policy (e.g. a reform of the social security system) in an
environment where the policy preference of voters and o¢ ce-holders, including both the executive
leader and legislators, may become misaligned after elections due to an unexpected change in the
state of the world. We show that a parliamentary system leads to comparatively better policies for
the majority of the population as long as the likelihood that the o¢ ce-holders remain aligned with
their constituencies is large enough. Intuitively, this condition can be interpreted as requiring that
the quality of political representation in the society be su¢ ciently high.
The traditional argument in favor of parliamentarism is that it allows for the possibility of
replacing an unpopular or incompetent government prior to elections.8 Indeed, many political
analysts in Brazil supported a parliamentary regime as being the most "modern" and "exible"
alternative. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that parliamentarism is also the regime that is
most "intensive" in political institutions, in that it requires a strong system of protection against
expropriation, particularly at the local level, and a class of politicians that can be trusted to
represent well the interests of voters.
This paper is related to a growing literature on endogenous political institutions, including
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Aghion and Bolton (2003), Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004),
Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008), Robinson and Torvik (2009), Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) and
Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2011). Among these, Robinson and Torvik (2009) is the study
that is most closely related to our work. They also investigate the question of the choice of form
7See Persico, Silverman and Rodríguez-Pueblita (2011) for examples on how some of these legislators operate to
bring funds to their strongholds.
8 In a recent article entitled "Does Egypt Need a Pharaoh?", Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz argued for the adoption
of a parliamentary system in Egypt on the basis that "to elect a president is to commit to one person, generally for
at least four years. But it is very uncertain that any person elected today in Egypt would have the same support in
even a year. (. . . ) It is also possible that a new president turns out to be incompetent, or is in a permanent minority
position and unable to pass legislation".
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of government, although their main focus is on the interests of political elites behind the process
of constitutional choice. They argue that presidential regimes are prevalent in Africa and Latin
America because it is the system that generates most rents to its leaders.9
Although the argument put forward by Robinson and Torvik (2009) may well apply to a number
of historical cases, our analysis suggests that it cannot be taken as a general explanation for the
predominance and persistence of presidential systems in developing countries, especially in Latin
America. In this respect, our paper sheds new light on the question of the endogenous choice of
form of government by focusing specically on the interests of the population. We contribute to
the literature by providing novel evidence about the constitutional preferences of voters in Brazil.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the rst to use referendum data to examine this
important issue.
The results of this paper are also related to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who emphasize
the fact that di¤erent institutions are often closely linked to each other. This feature makes it
particularly di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ect of specic aspects of the institutional environment (i.e.
the issue of "unbundling institutions"). Interestingly, our model shows that the choice of form
of government depends on the quality of the accountability institutions in a society. This result
has important implications for empirical and policy-oriented research. For instance, several recent
papers have argued that presidentialism leads to more corruption (Lederman, Loayza and Soares
[2005], Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman [2005]). However, our analysis of the Brazilian experience
suggests that causality might run in the opposite direction; that is, it is possible that countries that
are more prone to corruption may also be more likely to adopt presidential systems.
This paper is also connected to a number of studies in comparative politics that have examined
the di¤erences between presidential and parliamentary systems. An inuential view in this literature
is that presidential democracies are inherently less stable and more prone to coups. This notion
has been argued by Linz (1978, 1990) and Stepan and Skach (1993), among others, based on the
fact that the relationship between executive and legislative tends to be more conictual under
presidential regimes. However, many scholars, including Shugart and Carey (1992), Mainwaring
and Shugart (1997) and Cheibub (2007), have challenged this view. According to Cheibub (2007),
the problem is not that presidential systems are fundamentally awed, but rather that "they tend
to exist in societies where democracies of any type are likely to be unstable". This perspective
highlights the fact that to understand the political and economic consequences of each system one
must rst understand the reasons behind their adoption. The present paper provides a contribution
in this direction by highlighting some of the main elements behind the process of constitutional
choice.
In the political economy literature, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) were the rst to
propose a formal model to compare the performance of presidential and parliamentary regimes.10
9 It must be noted that the type of presidentialism considered by Robinson and Torvik (2009) is one with very few
checks and balances, where the executive leader has extremely dominant powers, as in the cases of Joseph Mobutu
in Zaire and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
10Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) provide cross-country evidence that presidential systems have smaller gov-
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They show that presidential systems are associated with less political rents, while parliamentary
systems are associated with more redistribution towards broad population groups and a higher
provision of public goods. However, their model assumes that all voters are homogeneous and does
not allow for direct elections for president. As such, their framework is unable to account for the
stylized facts presented in this paper, particularly the evidence that poor citizens voted more for a
presidential regime.
Finally, our analysis highlights the fact that parliamentarism entails a type of scal decentral-
ization, in the form of more transfers to constituencies, which increases the need for better account-
ability institutions at the local level. The present paper is, in this sense, related to a literature on
scal federalism which also emphasizes the distinction between national and local institutions for
the performance of public policies (Prudhomme [1995], Tanzi [1995] and Oates [1999]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical back-
groud of the Brazilian referendum and presents the main stylized facts emerging from our empirical
analysis. Section 3 introduces the basic setup of the model and discusses its main assumptions.
Section 4 solves for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model. Section 5 presents our main
comparative results and section 6 provides a characterization of the constitutional preferences of
the various groups of the population. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Brazils Referendum of 1993
2.1 Historical Background
In April 1993, the Brazilian population voted in a referendum to choose between a presidential
and a parliamentary system of government. The decision to hold the referendum had been agreed
upon ve years earlier, during the discussions that led to the democratic constitution of 1988. The
proposal for its realization received strong support among members of the constitutional assembly
and served as a compromise solution to the controversial issue that the choice of form of government
proved to be.11 It was then decided that a presidential system would be provisionally adopted until
the referendum in 1993.
The period between the early 80s and mid 90s, which is often referred to as Brazils "lost
decade", was marked by a series of economic problems, beginning with the debt crisis of the 80s
and followed by a long period of stagation. At the same time, the country faced important
di¢ culties related to its fragmented party system and widespread corruption in both the executive
and the congress. Indeed, the rst popularly elected president after the military regime, Fernando
Collor de Mello, was impeached in 1992 amid accusations of running a vast inuence-peddling
ernments, while parliamentary regimes have more persistent scal outcomes (i.e. increases in government spending
during downturns are not reversed during booms).
11The presidential regime received active support from the goverment of president Jose Sarney (1985-1990), who
hoped to stay in o¢ ce for the remainder of his term. It also received the advocacy of parties with strong candidates
in the next presidential elections, including the PT (Luis Inacio Lula da Silva) and the PDT (Leonel Brizola). For
more historical details, see Silva (1990) and Bonavides and Andrade (2004).
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scheme. Around the same time, a massive corruption scandal was uncovered involving at least
forty three members of the congress, several public o¢ cials and a cartel of construction rms that
controlled the procurement of public works in several parts of the country.12
In this context, the debates around the referendum focused broadly on two main themes: the
issue of governability, i.e. the ability of government to respond e¢ ciently to crises and changes
in the political environment, and a lack of condence in the political institutions.13 On the one
hand, it was argued that a parliamentary system would help to create the necessary conditions for
the implementation of social and economic reforms, given the requirement that the government be
supported by a majority in parliament at all times. On the other hand, it was argued that only
under a presidential system would the population be able to directly choose its leaders and, as a
consequence, to have actual inuence on politics.
For approximately two months prior to the referendum, daily programs on TV and radio were
broadcast to present and discuss the various arguments for and against each alternative.14 The
parliamentary system received great support among legislators. A survey conducted in 1991 showed
that 74% of the members of the congress were in favor of this alternative, although some parties
with strong candidates in the upcoming elections ended up backing presidentialism.15
As shown in gure 1, the parliamentary regime started ahead in the polls. However, its ad-
vantage quickly faded as the campaigns on TV and radio began in mid February, after which one
observes a marked shift in voting intentions towards presidentialism. Many political analysists
attributed this change to an increase in votersperception that a parliamentary system was, in
fact, "government of congress". Indeed, this idea was heavily explored by the pro-presidentialism
campaign, which had one TV advertisement asking viewers to "imagine what would happen if we
put the country in the hands of the deputies...".16
The nal result of the referendum is reported in table 1.17 The presidential system was the
regime chosen by the population with 55% of the total votes. Note that a considerable fraction
of individuals, approximately 20%, cast a null or a blank vote. The turnout was around 75%:18
Overall, the parliamentary regime received more support in the rich states of the southeast, such as
Sao Paulo (34:5%) and Rio de Janeiro (26:6%), and less support in the poor states of the northeast,
such as Piaui (11:2%) and Paraiba (12:7%).
12See Fleischer (1997) for more details.
13See Lamounier (1992) for a more detailed discussion of the main issues involved in the debate.
14The Brazilian electoral law obliges all TV and radio stations to broadcast campaign advertisements free of charge.
The time on TV and radio was divided equally between supporters of each system.
15This survey was conducted by the Instituto de Estudos Economicos, Sociais e Politicos de Sao Paulo (IDESP),
an independent research institute (Jornal da USP, 12/07/1992).
16 Interestingly, the impeachment process of president Collor de Mello (Jan/1991-Oct/1992), which occurred in a
relatively orderly fashion and counted with an active involvement of the population, seems to have had the actual
e¤ect of stregthening the votersbeliefs in their ability to hold the executive government accountable. This idea was
also explored by the pro-presidentialism campaign, which used it to emphasize the fact that in a presidential system
"you choose (the president), and you can remove".
17Figure A1 depicts the actual ballot used in the referendum. In addition to the question regarding the decision be-
tween "parliamentarism" and "presidentialism", voters were also asked to choose between "monarchy" and "republic"
  a republican regime was ultimately adopted with 66% of the total votes.
18Voting is mandatory in Brazil.
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After the referendum, many explanations for the defeat of the parliamentary system were raised
by analysts and politicians involved in the campaigns. The congress and the political parties were
among the most blamed. According to a newspaper article, "supporters of parliamentarism agree
that the image of the congress and the recent scandals involving the institution did not help. What
you hear the most among the public is: not with this congress, not with this congress, laments Jose
Serra [one of the leaders of the pro-parliamentarism campaign]" (Folha de Sao Paulo, 04/18/1993).
Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, president of the country during 2002-2010 and, at that time, leader
of the Labor Party, explained the result in the following terms: "The Brazilian congress is an
institution that does not have the trust of the population." (Isto É, 04/28/1993). Almost fteen
years later, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, president during 1994-2002 and a strong supporter of a
parliamentary system, admitted: "After my experience as president and in retrospect, I have many
doubts. In reality, a parliamentary regime would have required a much stronger party system."
(Agencia Brasil, 10/03/2008).
2.2 Empirical Evidence: New Facts
This subsection presents main stylized facts about the results of the Brazilian referendum of 1993.
Our paper explores three sources of data. First, we use municipal level data on the outcomes of
the referendum obtained from the Supreme Electoral Court of Brazil (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
[TSE]) and several regional Electoral Courts. Although part of the information was missing or
unavailable, we were still able to recover data for 4; 178 municipalities, which amounts to 90% of the
countrys total population in 1993.19 Second, we use data from several opinion surveys conducted by
the Datafolha, an independent research institute, from February to April 1993, containing detailed
information about the voting intentions and the individual characteristics of a large number of
subjects.20 Finally, data on the social and economic characteristics of Brazilian municipalities for
the year 1991 were obtained from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa
Economica Aplicada [IPEA]). Table 2 reports basic descriptive statistics for the main variables used
in the analysis.
Figure 2 plots the relationship between income per capita and the percentage of valid votes (i.e.
excluding null and blank votes) cast for a parliamentary system, with each municipality represented
as a circle proportional to its population. The graph shows the existence of a strong positive
correlation between income per capita and the percentage of votes for a parliamentary system
across Brazilian municipalities. Remarkably, the R2 of this simple regression line is 0:56. Observe
that this relationship is not systematically driven by population size, although large municipalities
do tend to be richer on average. Moreover, using micro data from an opinion poll conducted before
the referendum, gure 3 shows that the intention to vote for a parliamentary system increases
19 In Brazil, a municipality is dened as the smallest administrative subdivision to have its own democratically
elected leadership, a mayor and a local assembly.
20These datasets were obtained from the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública, CESOP-UNICAMP.
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with household income. Thus, the evidence that the poor (rich) voted more for a presidential
(parliamentary) system exists both at municipal and individual levels.
How robust are these results? At the municipal level, gures 4 and 5 show, respectively, that this
evidence cannot be accounted for by income inequality (Gini coe¢ cient) or voting for charismatic
and populist leaders, as measured by the percentage of votes for Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (Labor
Party) in 1994.21 ;22 Moreover, gure 6 shows that the stylized fact remains even after controlling
for the party a¢ liation of mayors, which captures specic characteristics of the local politics.
Another possible explanation for this evidence could be attributed to the fact that poor indi-
viduals simply lacked knowledge about the referendum and, therefore, voted more for a presidential
system merely because it represented the status quo. In order to investigate this possibility, we use
information from an opinion survey which asked individuals to point out at least two di¤erences
between presidential and parliamentary regimes. Since the answers to this question were sponta-
neous, they allow us to identify a subgroup of people who can be considered to be "knowledgeable"
enough about the referendum.
Out of 2; 607 subjects interviewed, 1; 059 (40:6%) were able to correctly point out two or more
di¤erences between the two alternatives.23 Table 3 provides a summary of the voting intentions
of subjects both in the full sample and in the subsample of "informed individuals". Surprisingly,
voters with more knowledge about the referendum were comparatively more likely to vote for a
presidential rather than a parliamentary system. Figure 7 then plots the voting intentions of
informed and uninformed individuals across di¤erent classes of income. Observe that contrary to
our initial expectation informed poor individuals were actually more likely to vote for a presidential
system.24 We nd, therefore, strong evidence that information about the referendum does not
account for the stylized fact presented above. This is an interesting result in itself, considering that
a lack of information among voters is often viewed as one of the main explanatory factors for the
results of the 1993 referendum.
We further investigate the determinants of the constitutional preferences of voters in Brazil
by performing a more detailed regression analysis. At the municipal level, table 4 presents the
results of OLS regressions in which the percentage of valid votes cast for a parliamentary system
is regressed on four main socio-economic variables, namely the logarithm of income per capita, the
21Lula was the most popular left-wing candidate in the two presidential elections of 1989 and 1994.
22An interesting aspect of the Brazilian case is that the referendum took place in an environment without the
presence of any particularly dominant political gure. In fact, the then current president, Itamar Franco, was just
"lling the gap" between one government and another after the impeachment of Fernando Collor de Mello in 1993
and the candidate eventually elected in the presidential elections of 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was actually
campaigning for a parliamentary system at the time of the referendum.
23Common answers to this question were: "the prime-minister is elected by the parliament", "the president is
chosen by the population", "the congress is in charge" and "the power belongs to the president".
24Observe that the voting intention for the parliamentary system increases sharply among uninformed individuals as
one moves from "less than 2 minimum wages" to "between 2 and 5 minimum wages". We conjecture that part of this
large increase is driven by the fact that the very poor individuals may have had a harder time articulating answers to
this relatively complex question. As a result, some of them may have ended up being classied as "uninformed", even
though they were actually knowledgeable about the di¤erences between the two systems. We, therefore, conjecture
that the "true" voting intention line for uninformed individuals is atter than the one depicted in gure 7, with their
voting intentions being more or less constant across income categories.
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logarithm of population, the illiteracy rate and the Gini coe¢ cient (income inequality), as well
as other municipal characteristics.25 Following Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) and Litschig and
Zamboni (2011), we also include the number of AM radio stations and a dummy for the presence of
federal judges and prosecutors in each municipality. These authors have shown that the local media
and judiciary play an important role in restraining corruption at the municipal level in Brazil, so
we use these variables as proxies for the presence of local accountability institutions.
The sample is restricted to municipalities with fewer than 500; 000 citizens in order to exclude
large outliers from the analysis All regressions include state xed e¤ects and we add dummies for
the party a¢ liation of mayors in columns [2] and [4]. Overall, our estimates reveal a consistent
pattern. The vote for a parliamentary system is always positively correlated with income per capita,
which shows that the stylized fact presented above is robust to controlling for main municipal
characteristics. Interestingly, the estimates for the number of AM radio stations and the presence
of federal judges and prosecutors are positive and statistically signicant across all specications,
suggesting that the local institutional environment is indeed relevant to the voting decision of
citizens.
Next, at the individual level, we use survey data to analize the determinants of the intention
to vote for a parliamentary system. The analysis takes into account several important explanatory
variables, including household income, level of schooling, a measure of political ideology and the
candidate voted for in the second round of the 1989 presidential elections, among other individual
characteristics.26 We also control for whether the person believes that "the country would be better
o¤ if the military returned to power" and whether the level of his or her trust in congress is "very
low".
Table 5 presents the estimation results. Column [1] reports estimates of a basic logit regression,
showing that individual income has, in fact, a positive e¤ect on the probability that a person
votes for a parliamentary system. However, this result must be qualied by the fact that, as
shown in column [2], both the magnitude and the signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients for each
class of income drop considerably as municipal xed e¤ects are included in the regression, i.e. the
importance of individual income decreases as we control for municipal characteristics. Therefore, we
nd evidence that the local economic and institutional environment is in fact relevant to determine
the vote of citizens. It is also interesting to note that voters who do not trust the congress are less
likely to vote for a parliamentary system, while individuals who dene themselves as being more
ideologically inclined towards the "right" tend to vote more for a presidential system.
Finally, we proceed to examine the main reasons behind the vote of Brazilian citizens in the
25The municipal characteristics considered in the analysis were the following: percentage of the population living
in rural areas, population density (inhabitants/km2), state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, percentage
of abstention, percentage of null votes and percentage of votes cast for the PSDB (Fernando Henrique Cardoso) and
the PT (Luis Inacio Lula da Silva) candidates in the 1994 presidential elections.
26The other individual characteristics included in the regressions were: gender, age, age squared, two dummy
variables indicating whether the person knows the name of the president and the name of the states governor and
four dummy variables indicating whether the person is religious, favours abortion, favours the death penalty and
serves in local communities.
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referendum. Figure 8 presents the results of a survey which asked individuals why they would not
vote for a parliamentary system. The most frequent reason was that "citizens do not have the right
to elect the leader and/or the members of the parliament are the ones who choose", which amounts
to 28% of the subjects who reported not voting for this alternative. Furthermore, when the sample
is restricted to the subgroup of informed voters, following the same criteria dened above, the
percentage of individuals dissatised with the lack of direct elections increases to 41%, while the
fact that "the congress is corrupt" was pointed out by 12% as the main reason for rejecting this
alternative.
As discussed before, a sense of dissatisfaction with congress and the political class in general
was widespread among voters and played a crucial role in shaping the results of the referendum.
We nd abundant anecdotal evidence in this direction. As a reader of the newspaper Folha de
Sao Paulo put it in a letter to the editor: "the referendum became a judgement of the congress".
Interestingly, other topics frequently highlighted by previous research, such as political stability
and size of government, were not nearly as prominent in public debates. That the trust in congress
should a¤ect the preferences over presidential and parliamentary systems seems intuitive, but the
case of Brazil makes it clear that this element may be of rst-order importance in the context of
developing countries and recent democracies.
2.3 Discussion
Our analysis of the Brazilian referendum has established the existence of important and systematic
di¤erences in voting patterns across population groups. From a theoretical point of view, however,
it is unclear why di¤erent people should have distinct preferences over the form of government and,
in particular, why poor citizens should be more inclined towards a presidential system. While there
have been several related studies in the recent political economy literature (Persson, Roland and
Tabellini [1997, 2000] and Robinson and Torvik [2009]), none of them are able to fully account
for the stylized facts presented above. In a sense, the evidence from Brazil is quite puzzling. For
instance, many critics of presidentialism have pointed out that this system is inherently less stable
and more prone to coups (Linz [1978] and Stepan and Skach [1993]), while Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2004) have argued that redistribution is larger under
parliamentarism, which is especially benecial to the poor population. From this perspective, and
particularly after a long period of military dictatorship (1964-85), it would have been reasonable to
expect that Brazilian voters, especially the poor, would have been more supportive of the parlia-
mentary alternative, at least in order to decentralize power and restrict the authority of the central
government. Why, then, do we observe exactly the opposite in the data?
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3 Model
This section proposes a model to study and compare the performance of presidential and parlia-
mentary systems. The analysis focuses on the fundamental di¤erence between these two regimes:
while in presidential systems the executive leader is directly elected by voters and has a xed term
in o¢ ce, in parliamentary systems the executive leader is appointed by the parliament and may be
replaced if he receives a vote of no condence. The model highlights the main trade-o¤s involved
in the choice between these two forms of government. We use this framework to examine the fac-
tors that inuence the preferences of di¤erent population groups between these alternatives. Our
analysis concentrates primarily on explaining di¤erences in voting behavior across constituencies,
although some of its main insights could be used to explain part of the variation in individual voting
behavior as well.
3.1 Basic Setup
We consider a moral hazard model with a single period. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2001,
2006), the society is composed of two groups of voters, the "poor" and the "rich", indexed respec-
tively by superscripts p and r. The population is distributed over n constituencies or localities,
each consisting of a continuum of agents of the same group (i.e. citizens are either all poor or all
rich) with measure 1.27 The number of poor and rich constituencies is given by np and nr, with
np > nr. We use the term "constituency" to broadly refer to a group of voters, distinguished by
its geographical location, which serves as an electoral base for a representative. This structure
applies naturally to the case where a majoritarian system ("winner-take-all") is in place, but also
captures essential features of a proportional representation system with open party lists, given that
candidates usually target specic groups of voters in a certain region.28 ;29
The utility function of each individual i is given by:





(x  i)2 ; (1)
27Note that it would be possible to allow for income heterogeneity within each locality. Indeed, what is needed
in the model is simply the existence of a median voter in each constituency as well as in the society as a whole.
The homogeneity assumption is, therefore, imposed for simplicity and guarantees that there are only two types of
constituencies in the society, one where everybody is poor and one where everybody is rich. The present framework
does not yield many predictions about income inequality. However, this is not in contrast with the evidence that
local inequality does not seem to have played a major role in the Brazilian referendum (see gure 4 above).
28The geographic concentration of votes for legislators is a well documented phenomenon in many countries that
adopt multi-member district systems, e.g. Brazil (Fleischer [1976] and Ames [1995, 2001]), Colombia (Crisp and
Ingall [2002] and Crisp and Desposato [2004]) and Japan (Hirano [2006]). Formally, Myerson (1993) shows that such
systems encourage candidates to cater to narrow sub-constituencies ("favoured minorities"). The intuition for this
result is that appealing to larger fractions of the electorate makes the candidate "vulnerable" to an opponent who is
only targetting the minimum number of voters required to win elections.
29Ames (1995), in his analysis of the Brazilian electoral system, remarks that "legally, candidates may seek votes
everywhere in their states, but in reality many concentrate their campaigns geographically, nding most of their
support in one or more contiguous regions, regions popularly referred to as "electoral strongholds" (redutos eleitorais).
Why concentrate on a specic area? For diverse reasons: the candidatesfamilies have long held power in the region;
a party leader sent them to the area; they appeal to its voters; they make a deal with a local political leader."
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where  2 [0; 1] is a common tax rate, yi is the income level, `i  0 represents the provision of a
local public good in individual is constituency (e.g. investment in education), x 2 R is the position
of a national public policy (e.g. a reform of the social security system) in the ideological space and
i 2 fL; Hg denotes the agents preference over x, with H   L =  > 0. The parameter  is
such that 0 <  < 1, which guarantees that the utility function is strictly increasing and concave
in `i.
We suppose that the members of each group are identical in all respects. The poor voters
have income yp and preference p 2 fL; Hg, while the rich have income yr, with yr > yp, and
preference r 2 fL; Hg. The average income is normalized to unity, y = 1n (npyp + nryr) = 1, so
that yp < 1 < yr.
The population is represented by n+1 elected o¢ cials, one executive leader, e, and n legislators,
l 2 f1; :::; ng, elected in their respective constituencies. The utility function of each o¢ ce-holder j
(executive leader or legislator) is given by:
Vj = sj   1
2
(x  j)2 ; (2)
where sj  0 represents the amount of rents expropriated by o¢ ce-holder j and j 2 fL; Hg
denotes his preference parameter.
The vector of policies is given by (x; ( ; '; se) ; f(`i; si)gni=1) and consists of a set of variables
determined through the political process. The public policy x and the budget policy ( ; '; se) are
decided at the national level and must satisfy the aggregate budget constraint:
n'+ se  n; (3)
where ' represents a lump-sum transfer common to all constituencies and se is the amount of
rents expropriated by the executive leader.30 At the local level, transfers are allocated between
the provision of local public goods, `i, and political rents to the local legislator, si, subject to the
following budget constraint:31
`i + si  ' (4)
We assume that the politicians cannot commit to policy platforms prior to elections. This
creates a moral hazard problem in that once in o¢ ce they will have an incentive to implement
the best policies for themselves. As in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), voters are able
to discipline their representatives only "retrospectively" by threatening not to reelect them at the
end of the period. The executive leader and the legislators are assumed to receive, respectively,
exogenous rewards !E  0 and !L  0 when reelected. These parameters capture, in a reduced-
30The assumption that transfers are common across constituencies can be interpreted as capturing the restrictions
imposed by a "federalist pact" on how resources can be distributed among voters. Note that our framework still
allows for redistribution towards the poor, since taxation is proportional to income. If transfers were allowed to be
targeted by groups, then the rich would always receive zero resources in equilibrium. The model could be extended to
incorporate some degree of "targeting", in addition to the lump-sum transfers, without changing our main insights.
31With a slight abuse of notation, we use the subscript i to refer both to constituencies and their members.
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form fashion, the benets associated with continuing in o¢ ce and remaining popular with voters,
which include "ego rents", legacy motives and future rents.
3.2 Preference Structure
We assume that the preference of the poor citizens is always given by p = L. At the beginning
of the period, the rich voterstype is realized with Pr (r = L) = , where the parameter  can
be interpreted as a measure of social homogeneity. After that, the government is formed with
all the o¢ ce-holders aligned with the preference of their respective constituencies: the executive
leader has the same type as the median (poor) voter, e = L, and all the legislators have the same
preference as their constituents, i.e. the legislators representing the poor have type L, while those
representing the rich have type r.
A preference shock then occurs with probability  2 (0; 1) and may change the preferences of
all the o¢ ce-holders. Each politician, executive leader or legislator, remains aligned with their
constituencies with probability  2 (0; 1), where the parameter  can be interpreted as a measure
of the quality of political representation in the society. After the occurrence of the shock, there are
four possible scenarios relevant to the analysis, two in which the preferences of the executive leader
and the median legislator are the same, e = lm , and two in which they are di¤erent, e 6= lm . We
suppose that the o¢ ce-holdersnew types are drawn independently from each other and that the
preferences of the executive leader and the median legislator are observed by everyone. Note that,
since all shocks are independent, nothing would change in the model if we allowed for a change
in the voterspreferences, provided that we have Pr (p = r) =  and that, after the shock, the
o¢ ce-holders remain aligned with their constituencies with probability .
This structure is intended to capture an environment in which the relevant policy issue (e.g.
international a¤airs or scal policy) becomes known only after the government is formed, due to
uncertainty about the future state of the world. The preference shock, thus, reects the possibility
of changes in current economic and political conditions combined with the fact that elected o¢ cials
may not be aligned with the interests of their constituencies in every policy dimmension. Further-
more, the assumption that the preferences of the executive leader and the median legislator are
observed after the shock captures the idea that their stance on some main political issues are known
from public speeches, debates and interviews, as well as from their past career and background.
3.3 Political Structure
The government is divided into two branches, the executive and the legislative, each responsible
for a distinct but complementary role in the policy-making process. The legislative assembly
is composed of n members elected in their constituencies, while the executive is composed of a
single member whose appointment process depends on the form of government. Specically, in a
presidential system the president is elected and held accountable directly by the voters, while in a
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parliamentary system the prime minister is appointed and held accountable by the members of the
parliament, who can remove him through a vote of no condence.
After the uncertainty over preferences is resolved, the executive leader is called upon to make
a proposal eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)), which consists of a public policy ex and a budget policy (e ; e'; ese).
The proposal is then submitted to the legislature, where representatives vote separately on ex and
(e ; e'; ese). This structure captures both the de jure and the de facto agenda-setting powers held by
the executive leader under each regime.32 Furthermore, the assumption of a separate vote on each
issue is consistent with the common practice in most legislatures, where distinct bills, such as a
budget proposal and a reform of the health care system, are discussed and voted on independently.
The legislative process di¤ers across the two systems. In the presidential regime, each element of
the proposal is approved if supported by a majority of legislators. Otherwise, a default public policy
xo = L+H2 is implemented when ex is rejected, while a default budget ( o; 'o; soe) is adopted when
(e ; e'; ese) is rejected. In the parliamentary regime, on the other hand, after observing the proposal,
the members of the parliament vote on a motion of no condence on the executive. Intuitively, in
this case, the policy vector eq can be interpreted as the leaders "program of government". If the vote
of no condence is rejected, the prime minister remains in o¢ ce and the proposal is implemented.
Otherwise, a new executive leader e0 is appointed and given the chance to make another policy
proposal eq0, which is then voted on against the status quo, as in a presidential system.
We assume that the new prime minister is chosen among a pool of candidates from outside the
parliament and that the majority of legislators is able to select an agent with the same preference
as their own.33 As we shall discuss below, the cases in which the vote of no condence can make
a di¤erence are those where the preferences of the executive leader and the median legislator are
misaligned, e 6= lm . The new prime minister is not subject to a condence procedure, but is
held accountable by legislators who decide, by majority rule, whether to reappoint him or not at
the end of the period.34 The assumption of a single vote of no condence is in line with the fact
that many parliamentary democracies impose a limit on the number of censure motions that can
be proposed in a given period. It also captures the idea that most political issues require that a
decision be reached in a timely manner in order to avert an imminent crisis or so that the policy
itself does not lose its e¤ectiveness, in which case a vote against the government would be equivalent
32 Indeed, the majority of the bills in parliamentary systems are initiated by the cabinet, while many presidential
democracies provide substantial agenda-setting powers to their executive governments (Mainwaring and Shugart
[1997]). Even in the United States, where the president has only limited authority to propose bills, the executive
often plays a fundamental role in shaping legislation. An example of this can be found in the conduct of the Obama
administration during the negotiations over the health care reform. According to an article in the New York Times,
"in pursuing his proposed overhaul of the health care system, President Obama has consistently presented himself as
aloof from the legislative fray, merely o¤ering broad principles. (...) Behind the scenes, however, Mr. Obama and his
advisers have been quite active, sometimes negotiating deals with a degree of cold-eyed political realism potentially
at odds with the presidents rhetoric." (New York Times, 08/13/2009).
33The assumption that the new prime minister is selected from outside the parliament is in line with the notion of
a caretaker technocratic government taking o¢ ce after the fall of the cabinet. Recent examples of this include the
governments lead by Lucas Papademos in Greece and Mario Monti in Italy. From a formal perspective, we impose
this assumption in order to keep a symmetry between our models of presidentialism and parliamentarism.
34Allowing the parliament to replace the government for a nite number of times would not change any of the
results of the model.
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to maintaining the status quo.
After the legislative process is completed, a vector of policies (x; ( ; '; se)) is adopted under
both systems and each legislator decides how to allocate the transfers received by his constituency
between the provision of local public goods, `i; and expropriation of rents, si. Voters observe the
policies (x; ( ; '; se)) and (`i; si) as they are implemented. At the end of the period, they decide,
by majority rule, whether to reelect or not their representatives and the president based on their
behaviour during the period.
A strategy for citizens is a "retrospective voting rule", which species the conditions under
which an incumbent will receive their electoral support at the time of elections. We impose that,
in equilibrium, any voting rule must be credible (i.e. satisfy subgame perfection) in the sense
that voters do not want to reoptimize their strategies in later stages of the game, as additional
information becomes available. It is also assumed that a prime minister who receives the condence
of the parliament is always reappointed, while the "second" prime minister is held accountable by
the legislators and depends on their political support at the end of the period in order to remain in
o¢ ce (i.e. the legislators decide whether to reelect him or not). Intuitively, the new prime minister
has his proposal voted on only against the status quo and, as a consequence, does not receive the
"full" condence of the parliament.
3.4 Accountability Institutions
Finally, we describe the role of the accountability institutions in our framework. First, it is assumed
that when a legislator i is not reelected, voters are able to recover the expropriated resources, si, with
probability i 2 (0; 1), where the parameter i can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of local
institutions. We suppose that the level of institutional protection in poor and rich constituencies is
distinct, with r > p. This heterogeneity generates a variation in the ability of voters to constraint
expropriation at the local level, so that corruption constitutes a greater burden to the poor than
to the rich. This feature of the model is in accordance with recent empirical evidence by Ferraz
and Finan (2008, 2011), who emphasize the role of the local media in restraining corruption in
Brazilian municipalities. Similarly, we assume that when the executive leader is not reappointed,
the expropriated resources, se, are recovered with probability  2 (0; 1), where the parameter
 captures the quality of national institutions (e.g. federal prosecutors and the national media)
which provide common protection to the population as a whole. Observe that the assumption
that both national and local institutions act only when an o¢ ce-holder is ousted from power is in
accordance with the fact that a thorough investigation of a corruption scandal may be hindered
either because the politician while in o¢ ce is in a privileged position to manipulate evidence or due
to constitutional immunities that are often granted to o¢ ce-holders. In any case, all qualitative
results of the model would remain unchanged as long as we assumed that the probability with
which a politician is prosecuted is higher when he is not in o¢ ce.
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3.5 Timing
To summarize, the timing of the events under the presidential system is as follows:
(1) The preference shock occurs with probability , determining the preferences of the executive
leader and the median legislator, e and lm :
(2) The executive leader makes a policy proposal eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)):
(3) The congress votes separately on ex and (e ; e'; ese). Each element of the proposal is approved
if supported by a majority in congress. Otherwise, a default public policy xo = L+H2 is
implemented when ex is rejected, while a default budget ( o; 'o; soe) is implemented when
(e ; e'; ese) is rejected.
(4) Each constituency i receives a transfer ' and the local legislator decides how to allocate it
between local public goods, `i, and political rents, si.
(5) Elections are held and voters decide whether to reelect their representatives and the president.
The timing of the events under a parliamentary system is similar, except that stages (3) and
(5) are replaced by:
(30) The parliament votes on a motion of no condence on the executive. If the vote of no
condence is rejected, the prime minister remains in o¢ ce and the proposal is implemented.
Otherwise, a new executive leader e0 is appointed and given the chance to make another
proposal eq0, which is then voted on against the status quo.
(50) Elections are held and voters decide whether to reelect their representatives. A prime minister
who receives the condence of the parliament is automatically reappointed, while the "second"
prime minister depends on the support of the legislators to stay in o¢ ce (i.e. the legislators
decide whether to reelect him or not at the end of the period).
4 Equilibrium
This section solves for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the model. We proceed by backward
induction, starting in subsection 4:1 with an analysis of the nal subgame, which is common to
both systems of government. The presidential regime is, then, discussed in subsection 4:2 and the
parliamentary regime in subsection 4:3.
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4.1 Local Politics
After the vector of policies q = (x; ( ; '; se)) is approved and observed by all, each constituency
receives a transfer ' and the local legislator decides how to allocate it between the provision of local
public goods and the expropriation of rents. When the legislator decides not to pursue reelection,
his optimal strategy is to expropriate all the resources, in which case he obtains (1 i)' in expected
utility. Therefore, given the amount of transfers ' received, voters in each constituency formulate
their reelection rules so as to minimize the amount of rents expropriated by legislator i according





`i + si  ' (BCi)
si + !L  (1  i)' (ICi)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICi) guarantees
that the legislator prefers to pursue reelection rather than to implement his outside option. At the
optimum, both the budget and the incentive constraint must bind, so that:
si (') = max f(1  i)'  !L; 0g (6)
and
`i (') = ' max f(1  i)'  !L; 0g (7)
Intuitively, equation (7) determines the minimum amount of local public goods demanded by voters
in order to reelect their representatives. In equilibrium, policies are always adopted according to
these expressions and all the legislators are reappointed.
Observe that political rents are equal to zero when:
'  !L
1  i ;
In order to simplify the analysis, and to avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that the status quo
transfer is such that 'o > !L1 p , which guarantees that the amount of rents extracted by any
legislator representing the poor is always strictly positive. Observe that this condition can be re-
expressed as !L < 1 (1  p)'o, which requires that the reelection rewards of legislators are not
too high.
Assumption 1. !L < 1 (1  p)'o:
An important feature of the present framework is that legislators are held accountable for their
behavior at the local level, despite the fact that they also perform other actions prior to this
stage. Note that any subgame perfuct equilibrium requires that, once transfers ' are observed,
the optimal reelection strategy of voters must be given by the solution to problem (5) above. This
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renders any other voting rule non-credible, as voters would always have an incentive to re-optimize
their strategies after transfers become known. The idea that representatives are held accountable
for their local behaviour is particularly reasonable in an environment where citizens do not have
access to the individual voting record of their representatives, either due to a low degree of political
awareness or a lack of congressional transparency.35
4.2 Presidential System
This subsection characterizes the policies implemented under a presidential system of government,
taking as given that the rents expropriated by legislators and the provision of local public goods
are determined, respectively, by equations (6) and (7) derived above.
4.2.1 Legislative Process
Suppose that a proposal eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)) has been submitted to congress. Observe that it is
dominant for each legislator l to vote in favour of the budget proposal (e ; e'; ese) if, and only if,
sl(e')  sl ('o). Under assumption 1, we have that sp ('o) > 0, so that the amount of rents
extracted by the legislators representing the poor is positive and strictly increasing in transfers.
Thus, the condition for the approval of (e ; e'; ese) is given by:
e'  'o (AP1)
Similarly, the public policy ex is approved in congress if, and only if, a majority of legislators prefers
it to the status quo, xo = L+H2 , which requires that:
 1
2
(ex  lm)2   2
8
; (AP2)
where lm denotes the preference of the median legislator lm. We refer to these conditions as the
"approval constraints".
4.2.2 Incentive Constraint on the President
After the occurrence of the preference shock, the executive leader is called upon to make a proposaleq: The president is held accountable by the voters, but always has the option to give up reelection
and propose a policy that maximizes his utility subject to the budget constraint and the conditions
for congressional approval, (AP1) and (AP2) : In this case, the president sets  = 1 and ' = 'o,
35These conditions are especially likely to hold in new democracies and developing countries. According to Ames
(1995), "Brazilian citizens exert pressure for pork-barrel programs, but on broader issues they have little control
over their representatives. This should come as no surprise, because no one observing a Brazilian election would
feel condent that many voters know anything at all about the positions of their deputies". Moreover, even in the
case of highly developed countries such as Japan, several studies have documented that a considerable fraction of the
electorate vote exclusively on the basis of local and parochial interests (Richardson [1997]).
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which gives him n(1   )(1   'o) in expected utility. Furthermore, when e = lm , he is able to
approve his preferred policy x = e, while when e 6= lm he is able to obtain at most xo = L+H2 ,
due to the opposition of congress.








where 1fe 6=lmg is an indicator function that equals one when the preferences of the president and
the median legislator are misaligned. In order to focus on the interesting case, we assume that
  n(1   )(1   'o)   !E > 0, which guarantees that the amount of rents extracted by the
executive leader is always strictly positive, se > 0. Intuitively, this condition requires that the
reelection rewards of the president are not too high.
Assumption 2. !E < n (1  )(1  'o).
4.2.3 Equilibrium
The poor voters constitute the majority of the population and are, therefore, decisive for the
reappointment of the president. Thus, given the realization of the politicianspreferences, e and




(1  ) yp + 1





n'+ se  n (BC)
(ICe) ; (AP1) ; (AP2)
The main properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the next lemma.36
Lemma 1. The equilibrium under a presidential system is characterized by the following properties:
i: The tax rate may be lower than one,   1.
ii: The size of transfers is (weakly) increasing in the quality of institutions available to the poor,
p, and (weakly) decreasing in the poor votersincome, yp. Furthermore, transfers are always
such that '  1  n .
iii: The amount of rents extracted by the executive leader is such that se  , with strict inequality
when e = H .
36All proofs for this paper are collected in Appendix A.
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iv: For any type of median legislator, the distance jx   Lj is largest when the president is mis-
aligned with the preference of the poor population, i.e. e = H .
In a presidential system, the existence of direct elections for the executive branch provides an
institutional mechanism for the poor to inuence policies according to their interests. In particular,
the size of the taxes and transfers "demanded" by the population depends both on the cost of
taxation and on how e¤ectively the resources can be converted into local public goods. Formally,
the optimal transfers are such that:
' = max f'o; b'g ,
where (assuming that the constraint   1 is not binding) b' is implicitly determined by:
`p(b') 1p| {z }
marg. utility of transfers
= yp| {z }
marg. cost of taxation
(9)
Therefore, in equilibrium, transfers are: (i) (weakly) increasing in the quality of institutions avail-
able to the poor, p, which reduces the expropriation of rents at the local level, and (ii) (weakly)
decreasing in the poor votersincome, yp, which raises the cost of taxation for the members of this
group.37
An important drawback associated with direct elections is that they impose a limit on the
frequency with which voters are able to check the government, so that a misaligned president,
e = H , can never be removed from o¢ ce before the end of his term. The executive leader
is, therefore, in a strong position to push for outcomes that are favourable to himself and, as a
consequence, is able to extract more rents and to distort the public policy towards his preferred
position.
Observe that, from the incentive compatibility constraint, it follows that political rents are given
by:
se = +	(ex;), (10)
where 	(ex;) = 12 (ex  e)2   1fe 6=lmg28 is the amount of rents that must be paid above  in
order to incentivize the president to propose a public policy ex. When the executive leader is aligned
with voters, e = L, the equilibrium entails x = L when lm = L and x =
H+L
2 when lm = H ,
so that 	(x;) = 0 in both cases. A misaligned executive leader, on the other hand, must be paid
additional rents in order to propose a policy that is closer to the voterspreference. The size of
these rents is given by:
	(ex;) = 1
2
(ex  H)2   1fe 6=lmg28 (11)
At the optimum, voters choose ex in order to equalize the marginal benet of reducing the distance
jex Lj and the marginal cost of having to provide extra rents for the president. Therefore, se  ,
with strict inequality when e 6= L, and from the budget constraint it folows that '  1  n .
37Note that these results are "weak" given the possibility that b' < 'o.
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4.3 Parliamentary System
We now proceed to characterize the vector of policies implemented under a parliamentary system
of government. As before, the rents expropriated by legislators and the provision of local public
goods are determined, respectively, by equations (6) and (7) derived above.
4.3.1 Legislative Process
Suppose that a program of government eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)) has been proposed by the prime minister.
The members of the parliament vote on a motion of no condence on the executive. If the vote of
no condence is rejected, the prime minister remains in o¢ ce and the proposal is implemented, in
which case each legislator obtains:
Vl = sl(e')  1
2
(ex  l)2 (12)
If, on the other hand, the motion of no condence is approved, a new prime-minister e0 is
selected, with a preference equal to that of the median legislator, e0 = lm , and given the chance
to make another proposal eq0, which is then voted on against the status quo. The new executive
leader is not subjected to the condence of the parliament, but legislators are able to hold him
accountable by threatening not to reappoint him at the end of the term. Specically, the median








n'+ se0  n (BC)
se0   12 (x  e0)2   (ICe0)
where   n  1   (1  'o) !E > 0 under assumption 2: As before, the incentive compatibility
constraint (ICe0) guarantees that the executive leader prefers to pursue reelection rather than to
implement his outside option. Observe that there is no conict associated with the public policy
decision in this case, since both the median legislator and the "second" prime-minister have identical
preferences.
The optimal solution to this problem involves setting x = lm and se0 = . Moreover, since
the amount of rents expropriated by legislators is increasing in transfers, and strictly so for any
legislator representing the poor (under assumption 1), the reappointment rule species  = 1 and
' = 1   n , i.e. taxes and transfers are set as high as possible. Therefore, the utility obtained by









From equations (12) and (14), it follows that it is dominant for the median legislator to support








where we refer to this condition as the "condence requirement" constraint.
4.3.3 Equilibrium
Proceeding by backward induction, after the occurrence of the preference shock, the prime minister
is called upon to make a proposal eq subject to the condence requirement of the parliament.
Formally, he proposes a policy that maximizes his utility according to the following problem:
maxex2R; (e;e')2[0;1]2 ese   12 (ex  e)2 (15)
s:t:
(
ne'+ ese  ne (BC)
(CR)
When the preferences of the prime-minister and the median legislator are the same, e = lm ,
the optimal solution is given by: x = lm , se = ,  = 1 and ' = 1   n . That is, the executive
leader simply announces exactly the same policies that would have been proposed by his successor
had he been defeated in the vote of no condence. When, on the other hand, the prime minister is
not aligned with the parliament, e 6= lm , the optimal solution involves a distortion of the reform
away from the median legislators preference in exchange for an increase in the size of transfers to
constituencies.
Observe that the "relevant" median legislator for this problem is always a representative of the
poor. Indeed, the executive leader prefers to seek the support of legislators from this group, since
they are "cheaper" to buy. Intuitively, a poor representative is able to extract more rents out of the
same amount of tranfers and, therefore, requires fewer resources in order to support the government
whenever x 6= lm . Furthermore, by obtaining the suport of the median poor legislator, the prime-
minister automatically guarantees the votes of all other poor representatives. This is because the
parliament members with median preference are always the ones whose support is most di¢ cult to
obtain, given that they hold control over the appointment of the following government and, as a
result, have better outside options.
The main properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium under a parliamentary system is characterized by the following prop-
erties:
i: The tax rate is always equal to one,  = 1.
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ii: The size of transfers is such that '  1  n , with strict inequality when e 6= lm .
iii: The amount of rents extracted by the executive leader is such that se  , with strict inequality
when e 6= lm.
iv: When the executive leader is of type e = H , the distance jx   Lj is smallest when the
median legislator is aligned with the preference of the poor population, lm = L.
In a parliamentary system, the ability to check the executive is delegated to legislators, who
hold the prime minister accountable through the condence procedure. This implies that the
members of the parliament are in a strong position to push for higher transfers, which expands
their expropriation opportunities at the local level. The executive leader, in turn, sets the tax rate
at its maximum, both in order to satisfy the demands of legislators and to raise his own rents.
At the same time, the vote of no condence adds exibility to the parliamentary system by
providing an institutional mechanism to replace the prime minister before the end of his term. A
misaligned leader, e 6= lm , must satisfy the demands of the parliament to stay in o¢ ce and is,
therefore, forced to accept a reduction in rents whenever the public policy is to be distorted away
from the median legislators preference. Formally, the condence requirement imposes that:






(ex  lm)2 ; (16)
where sp () is the amount of rents obtained by a legislator representing a poor district. Observe
that when ex 6= lm , we must have that e' > 1  n and ese < .
Overall, the condence procedure strengthens the bargaining power of the parliament consid-
erably. Thus, an important requirement for the parliamentary system to perform in accordance
with the interests of voters is that the legislative be expected to represent the preferences of the
population with su¢ ciently high likelihood. In particular, observe that the vote of no condence
works in favor of the poor citizens whenever e = H and lm = L. In fact, this is the only case
where the condence procedure may be e¤ectively used to protect their interests.
5 Main Comparative Results
This section presents the main comparative results of our analysis. The rst proposition compares
the size of taxes, transfers and political rents under both systems of government.
Proposition 1. From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that:
i: The tax rate is higher under parliamentary systems:
pres  parl = 1
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ii: The size of transfers and the provision of local public goods are higher under parliamentary
systems:
'pres  'parl and `presi  `parli ;
with E('pres) < E('parl) and E(`presi ) < E(`
parl
i ).
iii: The expected amount of rents extracted by legislators is larger under parliamentary systems:
E(spresl )  E(sparll ),
with strict inequality if the legislator represents a poor constituency, while the expected amount
of rents obtained by the executive leader is larger under presidential systems:
E(sprese ) > E(sparle )
Intuitively, in a parliamentary system, the threat of a vote of no condence allows the members
of the parliament to push for larger transfers to their constituencies and, as a result, to obtain
additional rents for themselves. In a presidential system, on the other hand, the existence of direct
elections for the president increases the ability of voters to inuence policies, which limits the size
of transfers and the amount of rents obtained by legislators, while at the same time allowing the
executive leader to extract more rents. The model emphasizes that the balance of powers among
agents is distinct under each regime: the legislative has more control over policies under parlia-
mentary systems, while both voters and the executive leader have more power under presidential
systems. Interestingly, our analysis shows that not only do direct elections strengthen the political
inuence of voters and the executive, but also that these two phenomena are intrinsically connected
to each other.
The conclusion that taxes and transfers are smaller under presidential systems is consistent
with the theoretical results obtained by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) as well as with the
empirical evidence provided by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) and Coate and Knight (2011).
A novel implication of our analysis is that the size of transfers under presidential systems should
be increasing in the quality of institutions available to the median voter.38 Intuitively, additional
transfers are only worth to the population if a reasonable fraction of the resources is expected to
translate into local public goods. This idea is in accordance with the ndings obtained by Olken
(2006), who studied the performance of an anti-poverty program in Indonesia, showing that the
losses arising from corruption may have actually outweighed the intended benets of the transfers.
Finally, our results concerning the amount of rents extracted by the executive leader and legis-
lators is similar to those obtained by Robinson and Torvik (2009), despite the fact that our analysis
is based on a fundamentally di¤erent mechanism. Note, however, that our model does not yield any
38Observe that when the quality of local institutions is high enough, voters want to have taxes and transfers set as
high as possible. This is the reason why we use weak inequalities in order to express the results in items i and ii of
proposition 1.
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unambiguous prediction regarding the total amount of political rents expropriated in each system,
which is in contrast with both Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), who showed that political
rents are always higher under parliamentary regimes, and Robinson and Torvik (2009), who reached
exactly the opposite result. Indeed, for any  2 (0; 1), there are two extreme cases that, in the
context of our model, are interesting to consider: (i) when p = r = 0 (i.e. local institutions are
completely dysfunctional), political rents are larger under parliamentary systems; while (ii) when
p = r = 1 (i.e. local institutions are fully e¢ cient), political rents are larger under presidential
systems.
The next proposition compares the quality of the public policies approved under each regime.
Proposition 2. If the number of poor and rich constituencies is such that np > nr + 1 and
 = H   L is large enough, then there exists a threshold  such that if    the expected
distance between the public policy and the poor voters preference is lower under parliamentary





The vote of no condence provides extra exibility to the parliamentary system by allowing
legislators to replace a misaligned leader before elections. Indeed, the above proposition shows
that the condence procedure leads to better policies for the majority of voters provided that the
probability of post-shock congruence, , is su¢ ciently high. To understand the intuition behind
this result, observe that the median legislators type is determined by aggregating across many
representatives. Thus, when 12 <  < 1, the likelihood that the median legislator is aligned with
voters is larger than that of any single politician, as "negative shocks" can be cancelled out in
the aggregation process. In this case, the parliament is expected to better represent the interests
of citizens than the executive. Finally, in order to guarantee that the quality of public policies
is indeed higher under parliamentary systems,  must be su¢ ciently large, so that the median
legislator is aligned with voters with enough frequency.
From the perspective of the rich voters, it is interesting to consider two particular cases: (i)
when  = 1, the preferences of rich and poor citizens are always the same, r = L, so that the
results discussed above apply to both groups; while (ii) when  = 0, their preferences are always
di¤erent, r = H , so that they have exactly opposite views about the quality of the public policies
under each regime.39 Thus, our analysis suggests that it should be more di¢ cult to reach an
agreement about the choice of form of government in societies with a high degree of preference
heterogeneity.
Finally, note that the public policies adopted in each system become increasingly similar as the
likelihood of preference shocks decreases, i.e., for any  2 (0; 1), the absolute di¤erence jxpres xparlj




xparl = L. This feature of the
model emphasizes the idea that an important element of the di¤erence between presidential and
parliamentary systems is related to the way in which they are able to respond to changes in the
political environment.
39Formally, we have: E[ (xpres   L)2]  E[(xparl   L)2] $ E[ (xpres   H)2]  E[(xparl   H)2].
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6 Constitutional Design
This section analyzes the model developed above to study the preferences of voters and politicians
over the form of government. A hypothetical constitutional stage is introduced at the beginning of
the period, before any uncertainty over policy preferences is realized. It is assumed that every aspect
of the model is common knowledge and that agents know their future social status and political role
in the society. Following Buchanan and Tullock (1962), we study the issue of constitutional design
from a positive point of view. Our main goal is to investigate the reasons behind the institutional
choices of the various population groups, assuming that, at least in the medium run, citizens (poor
and rich) and o¢ ce-holders (executive leader and legislators) are to remain in their respective social
and political positions.
The next proposition characterizes the constitutional preferences of politicians.
Proposition 3. With respect to the constitutional preferences of o¢ ce-holders:
i: The executive leaders expected utility is always higher under presidential systems:
E(V prese ) > E(V parle )
ii: There exists  2 (0; 1) such that if Pr (l = lm)  , then the expected utility of legislator l
is higher under parliamentary systems:
E(V presl ) < E(V
parl
l )
According to our analysis, the executive leader prefers a presidential system, where the certainty
of a xed term in o¢ ce provides insulation against the checks of voters and the congress, while
the legislators, on the other hand, tend to prefer a parliamentary system, where the condence
procedure allows them to exert a more active role in the political process.40 Note that in this case
each representative is able to extract more rents and, conditional on belonging to the majority
in congress, to obtain better public policies for themselves. Thus, the parliamentary regime is
preferred by a legislator if the probability of him belonging to the majority is su¢ ciently large, i.e.
Pr (l = lm)  , where the exact threshold  depends on the amount of rents that he is able to
extract under each system. Moreover, the analysis also implies that the legislators representing the
poor are relatively more likely to prefer the parliamentary system, given that they belong to the
majority coalition with greater likelihood.
We now turn to the constitutional preferences of citizens. The next results are derived under
the assumptions required for proposition 2. We start by characterizing the conditions under which
the poor voters prefer each regime.
40As discussed before, this result is consistent with the evidence that the majority of legislators in Brazil, around
74% , were in favour of a parliamentary regime.
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Proposition 4. (Poor voters) For any given level of income 0 < yp < 1, we have that :
i: If p and  are small enough, then the expected utility of the poor voters is higher under
presidential systems.
ii: If p and  are large enough, then the expected utility of the poor voters is higher under
parliamentary systems.
The poor voters prefer a presidential system of government whenever the quality of local insti-
tutions, p, is weak and the probability of post-shock congruence, , is low. In this case, a large
fraction of the transfers is diverted by legislators due to the lack of institutional protection at the
local level. Furthermore, public policies are expected to be worse under parliamentary systems
given that the median legislator cannot be trusted to represent the voterspreferences with high
likelihood. Under these conditions, it is best for the poor to keep the ability to check the executive
leader through direct elections. This allows them to impose a limit on the size of taxes and trans-
fers as well as to demand policies that are more in line with their own preferences. Conversely, the
parliamentary system is preferred whenever the quality of local institutions and the probability of
post-shock congruence are both large enough. Overall, our results emphasize that the parliamen-
tarism is the regime which is most "intensive" in political institutions in that it requires a strong
system of protection against expropriation, particularly at the local level, and a class of politicians
that can be trusted to represent well the interests of voters.
Finally, we compare the constitutional preferences of rich and poor voters, focusing on the
following utility di¤erence:

  E(U r;parl   U r;pres)  E(Up;parl   Up;pres); (17)
where U j;k represents the utility of group j 2 fp; rg under regime k 2 fpres; parlg. Intuitively, 

provides a measure of how the relative preference towards the parliamentary system di¤ers between
rich and poor voters. For instance, if 
 > (<) 0, then the rich citizens prefer parliamentarism
relatively more (less) than the poor. We assume that the incentive compatibility constraint on the
rich legislators is always binding, so that we can focus on the more interesting case where variations
in r have an actual impact on rents. The next proposition summarizes our main conclusions.
Proposition 5. (Rich voters) Ceteris paribus, we have:











with strict inequality when E(pres) < 1:
The welfare cost generated by the expropriation of rents by legislators is not equally distributed
across the population. The better quality of the local institutions available to the rich, r > p,
allows them to obtain more benets from the larger transfers received under parliamentary systems.
At the same time, rich voters are more impacted by the higher taxes levied under parliamentary
systems, given that, in our model, taxation is proportional to income, which makes the presidential
regime more attractive to them. Interestingly, these results suggest that income per se cannot
account for the fact that the rich citizens in Brazil were more likely to vote for the parliamentary
system. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, discussions about taxation and redistribution did
not arise at all during the referendum.41 Instead, the model highlights that an important reason
behind the empirical evidence presented above can be attributed to di¤erences in the quality of
local accountability institutions across the population.
Observe that the above result does not allow us to determine the sign of 
. In order to do so,
we would have to examine the model for particular combinations of the parameters. Here, we focus
on a special case which, in our opinion, captures the main features of the political and institutional
environment in Brazil and other developing countries. Specically, we consider a situation where p
and  are small and yr = yp, which we impose in order to shut down redistribution in the model.42
Corollary 1. Suppose that p and  are small enough and yr = yp. Then, for any r > p, we
have:
E(Up;parl) < E(Up;pres) (18)
and

 = E(U r;parl   U r;pres)  E(Up;parl   Up;pres) > 0 (19)
Therefore, when the quality of the local institutions available to the poor is low and the congress
cannot be trusted to represent the interests of voters, then: (i) poor citizens prefer a presidential
rather than a parliamentary system, and (ii) rich citizens prefer a parliamentary system relatively
more than the poor.
7 Conclusion
This paper has studied the main factors that determine the constitutional preferences of citizens
for the form of government. We have focused on the case of Brazil, where a referendum in 1993
41We believe that the lack of discussion about these issues is reasonable, especially considering that to associate a
particular political regime with precise implications in terms of taxation and redistribution would require an extreme
form of rationality on the part of voters. Moreover, note that the insights from Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997, 2000) about redistribution policies under presidential and parliamentary systems were still unavailable even
to scholars at that time.
42Note that our qualitative result would remain unchanged as long as the income di¤erence, yr   yp, is not too
high.
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allowed the population to choose between a presidential and a parliamentary system of government.
Using a unique data set consisting of the results of the referendum, we show that, while the
Brazilian population in general voted in favour of a presidential system, there exists a strong
positive correlation between income per capita and the percentage of votes cast for a parliamentary
regime in each municipality. We also document that a common reason for rejecting a parliamentary
system was the absence of direct elections for the executive in connection with the lack of condence
in the congress.
We have proposed a model to explain the general pattern of the results of the referendum. The
analysis was based on a fundamental di¤erence between the two regimes of government: while in
presidential systems the executive leader is directly elected by voters and has a xed term in o¢ ce,
in parliamentary systems the executive leader is appointed by the parliament and may be replaced
if he receives a vote of no condence. We have shown that the parliamentary regime requires a
strong system of protection against expropriation, particularly at the local level, and a class of
politicians that can be trusted to represent well the interests of voters. We have also shown that
the poor groups in the population tend to prefer a presidential system because the lower quality
of their local accountability institutions makes them more vulnerable to expropriation of rents by
legislators.
This paper contributes to the literature on endogenous political institutions by studying a
particular case of constitutional reform. While we do not contend that the results of our analysis
apply irrespective of the political and institutional context, we believe that the model highlights
some of the key factors involved in the choice of political regime. As pointed out by North (1990),
the study of historical events provides a useful way to identify the main elements behind the process
of institutional change. This paper proposes the use of referendum data, in connection with a formal
theoretical analysis, as a valuable source of information about the preferences of the population
on certain political issues. We believe that a similar approach could be fruitfully applied to the




[1] Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson. 2005. "Unbundling Institutions." Journal of Political Economy,
113(5): 949-95.
[2] Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson. 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democ-
racy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective." Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(4): 938-63.
[3] Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson. 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions." American Eco-
nomic Review, 91(4): 938-63.
[4] Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson. 2006. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy."
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[5] Acemoglu, D., J. A. Robinson and R. Torvik. 2011. "Why do Voters Dismantle Checks and
Balances?" Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[6] Aghion, P., A. Alesina and F. Trebbi. 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 119(2): 565-611.
[7] Aghion, P. and P. Bolton. 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts." Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 1(1): 38-67.
[8] Ames, B. 1995. "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in
the Brazilian Congress." Journal of Politics, 57(2): 324-43.
[9] Ames, B. 2001. "The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil." Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
[10] Bonavides, P. and P. Andrade. 2004. Historia Constitucional do Brasil. Brasilia: OAB Editora.
[11] Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press.
[12] Cheibub, J. A. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
[13] Coate, S. and B. Knight. 2011. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence
from U.S. Municipalities." American Economic Journal: Public Policy, forthcoming.
[14] Crisp, B. F. and S. W. Desposato. 2004. "Constituency Building in Multimember Districts:
Collusion or Conict?" Journal of Politics, 66(1): 136-56.
[15] Crisp, B. F. and R. E. Ingall. 2002. "Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Represen-
tation: Mapping the E¤ects of Electoral Reform in Colombia." American Journal of Political
Science, 46(4): 733-48.
31
[16] Easter, G. M. 1997. "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia
and the NIS." World Politics, 49: 184-211.
[17] Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The E¤ects of Brazils Publicly-
Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3): 703-45.
[18] Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the
Audits of Local Government." American Economic Review, 101: 1274-1311.
[19] Fleischer, D. 1976. "Concentração e Dispersão Eleitoral: Um Estudo da Distribuição Geográ-
ca do Voto em Minas Gerais (1966-1974)." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 43: 333-60.
[20] Fleischer, D. 1997. "Political Corruption in Brazil." Crime, Law and Social Change, 25: 297-
321.
[21] Hirano, S. 2006. "Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from
Japanese Electoral Reforms." World Politics 58(1): 51-82.
[22] Kunicova, J. and S. Rose-Ackerman. 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as
Constraints on Corruption." British Journal of Political Science, 35(4): 573-606.
[23] Lamounier, B. 1992. "Parliamentarism in Brazil", in Arend Lijphart, (ed.), Parliamentary
versus Presidential Government, New York: Oxford University Press, 133-36.
[24] Lederman, D., N. Loayza and R. Soares. 2005. "Accountability and Corruption: Political
Institutions Matter." Economics and Politics, 17(1): 1-35.
[25] Lijphart, A. 1992. "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary,
and Poland, 1989-1991." Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4: 207-223.
[26] Linz, J. J. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibra-
tion. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
[27] Linz, J. J. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." Journal of Democracy, 1(1): 51-69.
[28] Litschig, S. and Y. Zamboni. 2011. "Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction." Working Paper,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[29] Mainwaring, S. and M. S. Shugart. 1997. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[30] Myerson, R. B. 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral
Systems." American Political Science Review, 87(4): 856-69.
[31] North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
32
[32] Oates, W. E. 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism." Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3):
1120-49.
[33] Olken, B. 2006. "Corruption and the Costs of Redistribution." Journal of Public Economics,
90(4-5): 853-70.
[34] Persico, N., A. Silverman and J. Rodriguez-Pueblita. 2011. "Factions and Political Competi-
tion." Journal of Political Economy, 119(2): 241-288.
[35] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 2003. The Economic E¤ects of Constitutions: What do the Data
Say? Cambridge: MIT Press.
[36] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutional rules and scal policy outcomes." American
Economic Review, 94: 25-46.
[37] Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini. 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Account-
ability." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4): 1163-202.
[38] Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini. 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance."
Journal of Political Economy, 108(6): 1121-61.
[39] Pinheiro, A. C. and C. Cabral. 1999. "Credit Markets in Brazil: The Role of Judicial Enforce-
ment and Other Institutions." IDB Working Paper, no 104.
[40] Prudhomme, R. 1995. "On the Dangers of Decentralization." World Bank Res. Observer,
10(2): 201-20.
[41] Richardson, B. M. 1997. "Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance." New
Haven: Yale University Press.
[42] Robinson, J. A. and R. Torvik. 2009. "Endogenous Presidentialism." Working paper, Harvard
University.
[43] Shugart, M. S. and J. M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and
Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[44] Silva, J. 1990. "Presidencialismo e Parlamentarismo no Brasil." Rev. de Ciencia Politica, 33(1):
p.14.
[45] Stepan, A. and C. Skach. 1993. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation:
Parlamentarism versus Presidentialism." World Politics, 46(1): 1-22.
[46] Tanzi, V. 1995. "Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some E¢ ciency and
Macroeconomic Aspects." Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 295-
316.
33
[47] Trebbi, F., P. Aghion and A. Alesina. 2008. "Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence
from US Cities." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1): 325-57.





The Lagrangian for problem (8) can be expressed as:
L = (1  ) yp + 1

`p (')   1
2
(x  L)2    (n'+ se   n)
 

  se + 1
2












  (   1)
where  , , 1, 2,  are the multipliers associated with (BC), (ICe), (AP1), (AP2) and   1;





`p (') 1 p = n   1 (21)
 =  (22)
(x  L) +  (x  e) + 2 (x  lm) = 0 (23)
The optimal level of transfers is such that:
' = max f'o; b'g , (24)
where b' is implicitly determined by `p(b') 1p = n . The multiplier  measures the marginal
cost of taxation. Note that when the constraint   1 is not binding we must have  = ypn , so that
`p(b') 1p = yp. Thus, it follows from equation (24) that transfers ' are (weakly) increasing in
p and (weakly) decreasing in yp:
Next, observe from equation (23) that the public policy x is a weighted average of the preferences
of voters and o¢ ce-holders. The weight attached to the presidents preference,  > 0, measures
the cost of providing him with additional rents, so that se and x are optimally chosen in order
to equalize their marginal rates of "return". From the incentive compatibility constraint, it then
follows that political rents are given by:
se = +	(x;) , (25)
where 	(x;)  12 (x  e)2   1fe 6=lmg
2
8  0. Note that when the constraint   1 is not
binding we have  = y
p
n < 1 and the public policy x (e; lm) is given by: x (L; L) = L; x (L; H)
= L+H2 ; x (H ; L) =
L+(y
p=n)H








= L+H2 , so that
jx (H ; lm)   Lj  jx (L; lm)   Lj for any lm 2 fL; Hg: Substituting these expressions into





> 0 and 	(x(H ; H)) = 18
2 > 0. Thus, it follows from equation (25) that se  , with strict
inequality when e = H ; from the budget constraint we have '  1  n .
Finally, the tax rate is residually determined by  = '+ 1nse and must satisfy   1. Observe
that as  = H   L rises, the amount of rents required to incentivize a misaligned president
increases, so that the constraint   1 must eventually bind.43 At this point, the marginal cost
of taxation,  , rises, leading to a possible reduction in the size of transfers relative to the solution
characterized in (24).44 The public policy is further distorted away from the votersoptimal posi-
tion, as the weight attached to the executive leaders preference, , increases. This, in turn, reduces
the amount of rents that must be paid to the president and helps to relax the constraint   1. 
A.2 Lemma 2
At the optimum the budget constraint must be binding, so that se = n (   '). Thus, the La-
grangian associated with problem (15) can be expressed as:
L = n (   ')  1
2











  n (   ') ;
where  and  are the multipliers associated with (CR) and se  0, respectively, and sp() is the
amount of rents obtained by a legislator from a poor constituency.
Observe that the optimal solution always involves setting  = 1. The rst-order condition with
respect to ' yields:
 =
n (1 + )
1  p ; (26)
where the multiplier  measures the marginal cost from the point of view of the prime minister of
providing additional rents for a poor legislator. The rst-order condition with respect to x is given
by:
(x  e) +  (x  lm) = 0; (27)
so that the public policy is a weighted average of the preferences of the executive leader and the
median legislator and, in particular, jx (e; H) Lj > jx (e; L) Lj for any e 2 fL; Hg: From
the condence requirement constraint, it, then, follows that the size of transfers must be such that:








(x  lm)2 ; (28)
which implies that '  1   n , with strict inequality when x 6= lm . Therefore, from the budget
constraint, se = n (1  '), we must have that se  .
Observe that when the constraint se  0 is not binding, the cost of raising additional rents for
legislators is  = n1 p , i.e.  = 0, and the implemented public policy is given by x =
e+(n=1 p)lm
1+(n=1 p) .
43Note from the results above that the expressions 	(x(H ; L)) and 	(x(H ; H)) are strictly increasing in 
when  < 1.
44Whether there is an actual reduction in transfers depends on whether the constraint '  'o is binding or not.
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22 when e 6= lm : Note that as  = H   L increases, the amount of transfers
required to compensate legislators for a distortion in the public policy relative to x = lm rises, so
that se  0 must eventually bind. At this point, the marginal cost of providing rents to the poor
legislators, , increases, which leads to a reduction in the distance between x and lm . This, in
turn, allows for a decrease in the size of transfers and helps to relax the constraint se  0. 
A.3 Proposition 1
The result that pres  parl = 1 follows from part i of Lemmas 1 and 2. Moreover, since sprese 
sparle (part iii of Lemmas 1 and 2), it follows from the budget constraint that 'pres  'parl and,
given that `i (') is strictly increasing in ', we must have `
pres
i  `parli for any constituency. Note
that 'pres < 'parl and `presi < `
parl
i whenever e = H or e 6= lm , which implies that E('pres) <
E('parl) and E(`presi ) < E(`
parl
i ). The result that E(s
pres
e ) > E(sparle ) follows directly from part iii
of Lemmas 1 and 2, while E(spresl )  E(sparll ) is due to 'pres  'parl combined with the fact that
sl (') is (weakly) increasing in ', and strictly so for a legislator representing a poor constituency
(from assumption 1). 
A.4 Proposition 2
Let  ij  Pr (e = i; lm = j), where i; j 2 fL;Hg. The probability of each conguration of the
o¢ ce-holderspreferences can be expressed as:









































































































Observe that the expected quadratic distance between the public policy and the median voters
preference is given by:
E[(x  L)2] =  LH(x (L; H)  L)2| {z }
case I
+  HL(x (H ; L)  L)2| {z }
case II
+  HH(x (H ; H)  L)2| {z }
case III
where we have used the fact that x (L; L) = L under both regimes.
Next, note that when  = H   L is large enough we can always guarantee that:
(xpres (L; H)  L)2 < (xparl (L; H)  L)2 (33)
and
(xpres (H ; L)  L)2 > (xparl (H ; L)  L)2; (34)
that is, when e = L and lm = H (case I), the public policy is closer to L under presidential
systems, while, when e = H and lm = L (case II), the public policy is closer to L under
parliamentary systems. The requirement that  be large enough is su¢ cient to rule out the cases
where (xpres (H ; L)   L)2  (xparl (H ; L)   L)2. Intuitively, this situation occurs whenever
yp and  are small enough, so that it is "inexpensive" for the poor to incentivize a misaligned
president to propose a policy that is very close to L. As we have shown in the proofs of Lemmas
1 and 2, the weight in the public policy attached to the preference of a misaligned leader increases
with  in a presidential system (see equation (23) and discussion in the last paragraph of the proof
of Lemma 1), while the weight attached to the preference of the median legislator increases with 
in a parliamentary system (see equation (27) and discussion in the last paragraph of the proof of
Lemma 2). Finally, observe that when e = H and lm = H (case III) the parliamentary system
is always worse for the poor:
(xpres (H ; H)  L)2 < (xparl (H ; H)  L)2, (35)
38
since xparl (H ; H) = H and xpres (H ; H) < H .45
Thus, in order to guarantee that the parliamentary regime yields better policies in expectation,
the conguration of preferences e = H and lm = L (case II) must occur with high enough
frequency relative to the other two possibilities. Here, we show that there always exists  large





! +1, provided that np > nr+1, so that there always exist a threshold 
such that if  >  the parliamentary system is preferred in terms of the public policies it generates.



































k (1  )n k + (1  )Pnrj=0Pn 12  (nr j)k=0  nrj  npk j+k (1  )n j k
The algebra involved in the proof is straightforward, but lenghty. Here, we simply skecth the main
steps of our argument. First, it is possible to show that both the numerator and the denominator
























































Intuitively, when  ! 1, we have  LL ! 1 and  HL;  LH ;  HH ! 0, i.e. the "dominant" case
is e = L and lm = L. Next, applying the LHospital rule, we can show that the denominator






The requirement that np > nr+1 is in order to guarantee that there are enough poor representatives
45The fact that xparl (H ; H) = H is an immediate consequence of equation (27), while xpres (H ; H) < H
follows from equation (23), which guarantees that the preference of the poor voters, L, always receives a strictly
positive weight in the public policy.
39
in the assembly so that Pr (lm = H) approaches zero rapidly enough. 
A.5 Proposition 3
Part i. Observe that in a presidential system the incentive compatibility constraint (ICe) pins
down the utility of the executive leader, so that:
V prese () =
(
 if e = lm
  182 if e 6= lm
(36)
while, in a parliamentary system, we have:
V parle () =
(
 if e = lm
<   182 if e 6= lm
(37)













2 when e 6= lm .46 Therefore, it must be that
E(V prese ) > E(V parle ): 
Part ii. In a parliamentary system, the utility of a legislator whose preference is aligned with the
median representative is determined by the condence requirement constraint (CR):






Observe that the expected utility of this same agent is strictly smaller in a presidential system, since




and E(xpres   lm)2 > 0.47 Thus, conditional on belonging to the "winning
coalition", a legislator is always better o¤ under a parliamentary system, i.e. E(V presl (l = lm))
< E(V parll (l = lm)). On the other hand, an agent who is not aligned with the median type may
actually do worse under a parliamentary regime, given that in this case the public policy is always
implemented far from his preferred position.
Note that the expected utility of a representative can be written, in general, as:
E(Vl) = Pr (l = lm)E(Vl (l = lm))| {z }
parliamentary sys. preferred
+ Pr (l 6= lm)E(Vl (l 6= lm))| {z }
presidential sys. may be preferred
(39)
Therefore, as long as the probability that a legislator is aligned with the median type is su¢ ciently
large, we have:
E(V presl ) < E(V
parl
l ) (40)
46Here, we consider the most favourable case for the prime minister, i.e. when the constraint se  0 is not binding,




1+(n=1 p) . See discussion in the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 2:





is due to the fact that 'pres  1  
n
, which in turn follows from sprese  
(see equation [25]).
40
Formally, there exists  such that if Pr (l = lm)  , then the above expression always holds.
In particular, it is guaranteed to be satised whenever Pr (l = lm) = 1. The exact value of the
threshold  depends on the parameters of the model. 
A.6 Proposition 4
Part i. The utility of the poor voters is given by:
Up = (1  ) yp + 1





(x  L)2| {z }
term II
(41)
Let us rst consider term I. Observe that when p is arbitrarily small, i.e. p ! 0, we have, for

























which follows from the fact that parl = 1 and lim
p!0

















with strict inequality when pres < 1. Next, consider term II. Note that when  is arbitrarily
small, i.e.  ! 0, we have:
lim
!0
E(xpres   L)2 < lim
!0
E(xparl   L)2; (45)
which follows from the fact that in this case the "dominant" conguration of preferences is e =
lm = H , so that xparl = H and xpres < H .48 Therefore, combining (44) and (45), we can
guarantee that E(Up;pres) > E(Up;parl) whenever p and  are su¢ ciently small. 
Part ii. Observe, rst, that when p is large enough, i.e. p ! 1, we have, for any possible
























48See discussion in footnote 42.
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which follow from the fact that in this case parl = pres = 1 and lim
p!1
















since 'pres  'parl (Proposition 1). Moreover, when  is large enough, i.e.  ! 1, we must have:
lim
!1
E(xpres   L)2 > lim
!1
E(xparl   L)2; (49)
which follows from Proposition 2. Therefore, combining (48) and (49), we can guarantee that
E(Up;pres) < E(Up;parl), whenever p and  are su¢ ciently large. 
A.7 Proposition 5







fE(U r;parl   U r;pres)g = Ef`r('parl) 1'parl   `r('pres) 1'presg (50)
To prove that this expression is strictly positive, consider the following derivative:
@
@'
f`r(') 1'g = `r(') 1; (51)
where  = 1 + ( 1)'`r(') 
r: Using the fact that `r('parl) = r'+ !L, we can write:







where the strict inequality comes from the fact that 0 <  < 1. Therefore, we have that
@
@'f`r(') 1'g > 0: This result, combined with the fact that 'parl  'pres, with strict inequality
when e 6= lm , implies that Ef`r('parl) 1'parlg > Ef`r('pres) 1'presg, so that @
@r > 0: 







fE(U r;parl   U r;pres)g = E(1  parl)  E(1  pres); (52)
49 In order to prove that pres = 1, suppose by contradiction that   1 is not binding. In this case the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with this constraint is equal to zero, i.e.  = 0, so that the rst-order condition in equation (21)
can be expressed as ('pres) 1 = yp, where we have assumed that 'pres  'o holds, i.e. 1 = 0 (we will show that
this is in fact the case). Observe that since 0 <  < 1 and 0 < yp < 1 we must have 'pres = (1=yp)1  > 1 (thus,
indeed, 'pres > 'o). But this implies that pres  1 must necessarily bind in equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
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= E(pres)  1  0; (53)







Note. This figure plots the evolution of voting intentions during the months preceding the referendum. The vertical line marks the beginning of 
the campaigns on TV and radio. Source: Datafolha Institute. 







Note. This figure plots the relationship between income per capita and the percentage of votes cast for a parliamentary system among valid 
votes, i.e. excluding null and blank votes. Each municipality is represented as a circle proportional to its population. The graph displays a linear 
regression line with R
2
= 0.56. 







Note. This figure plots the voting intentions for a parliamentary system for different classes of household income (as measured in numbers of 
minimum wages). The data refers to an opinion survey conducted by the Datafolha Institute on March 28
th
, 1993.  








Note. This figure plots the relationship between income inequality, as measured by the gini coefficient, and the percentage of votes cast for a 
parliamentary system. The graph displays a linear regression line with R
2
=0. 









Note. This figure plots the relationship between the percentage of votes received by Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (Labor Party) in the presidential 
elections of 1994 and the percentage of votes cast for a parliamentary system. The graph displays a linear regression line with R
2
=0. 







Note. This figure plots the relationship between income per capita and the percentage of votes cast for a parliamentary system, where we have 
partialled out the effect of the party affiliation of mayors. Each municipality is represented as a circle proportional to its population. The graph 
displays a linear regression line. 







Note. This figure plots the voting intentions of informed and uninformed voters for different classes of household income (as measured in 
numbers of minimum wages). The informed individuals consist of those subjects who were able to correctly indentify (in spontaneous answers) 
at least two differences between presidential and parliamentary systems of government. The data refers to an opinion survey conducted by the 
Datafolha Institute on March 3
rd
, 1993.  








Note. This figure reports the most common reasons mentioned by voters when asked why they would not vote for a parliamentary system. The 
subsample of informed individuals consists of those subjects who were able to correctly indentify (in spontaneous answers) at least two 















Note. This figure depicts the ballot paper used in the referendum. Voters were asked to choose between “monarchy” and “republic” as the 
“form of government” (left-hand side) and between “parliamentarism” and “presidentialism” as the “system of government” (right-hand side). 
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